Transparency log
Every adoption, document version, record batch, attestation and continuity link enters an append-only Merkle tree (RFC 6962 hashing over SHA-256). The registry publishes it in the C2SP tlog-tiles format so that existing transparency-log clients can verify it, and it signs a checkpoint at least every ten minutes. A leaf holds only {type, eid, object_sha256, received_at}: no name, email or other personal field ever enters it.
Current checkpoint
Section titled “Current checkpoint”- Tree size
- 14
- Root hash
- d30f4feb11674a743dfffc0c64d5dfe0aaecff221be599cb77e22e90cdf4f1db
- Signed
- 2026-10-25T03:50:13Z
Signed checkpoint (C2SP signed note)
Recent leaves
| Index | Type | Entity | Received |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13 | | ||
| 12 | | ||
| 11 | | ||
| 10 | | ||
| 9 | | ||
| 8 | | ||
| 7 | | ||
| 6 | | ||
| 5 | | ||
| 4 | |
Verify it yourself
Section titled “Verify it yourself”The checkpoint is a C2SP signed note with origin openentity.org/log, signed with the registry's Ed25519 key (did:web:openentity.org, published at /.well-known/did.json and /v1/spec).
- Fetch the checkpoint and check its signature against the registry key.
- Fetch the hash tiles at
/v1/log/tile/<level>/<index>and the entry bundles at/v1/log/tile/entries/<index>, and recompute the root. - For one object, fetch its inclusion proof at
/v1/log/proof/<index>?tree_size=<size>and check it against the root. - Between two checkpoints you saw, fetch
/v1/log/consistency?first=<m>&second=<n>and check the log only grew.
With the CLI: openentity log checkpoint, openentity log proof <index>, and openentity log audit <n>, which checks the checkpoint plus random inclusion proofs and object signatures. The repository also ships an independent Python verifier, scripts/independent_verifier.py, that uses no Open Entity code.
Snapshots and mirrors
Section titled “Snapshots and mirrors”A daily snapshot (one JSON line per leaf, plus that day's checkpoint) is published at /v1/log/snapshots/<date>.jsonl and copied off-site to storage with a one-year compliance lock, so the history is tamper-evident even against the registry operator. Anyone may mirror the log; a mirror verifies itself against the signed checkpoints.